Trump, who campaigned with the lie that all other countries are “ripping off” American taxpayers by achieving trade surpluses with the United States, began his trade war with China in 2018 by raising tariffs on its imports. This measure resulted in increased costs for U.S. consumers and led to devastating farmers who lost billions in sales to China after increasing retaliatory duties. But this still leaves much of the tariffs intact. Since the start of the trade war, the U.S. has imposed tariffs on more than $360 billion of Chinese goods, while China has imposed tariffs on U.S. imports worth about $100 billion. M. Trump said Friday that some measures relating to intellectual property and technology transfer would be included in the “Phase 1” agreement, with additional protective measures in later phases. Officials gave few details, although those briefed on the negotiations said the measures involved greater protection of copyright and patents. Iapac outlined two other negotiating frameworks, one on climate change and trade policy, the other on cross-border financial regulation and US demands to own part of China`s financial services sector.
The $50 billion target could also contain a generous estimate of the revenue impact of other parts of the deal. U.S. officials said they had negotiated faster food safety controls for imports into China and authorizations for genetically modified products, both of which could boost trade. In addition to the public health and public safety risk, the re-election of the “Chinese virus” will most likely result in high trade and investment costs, although White House officials insist that the Jan. 15 deal be “on track” for its implementation. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and Minister Perdue welcomed China`s steps to implement non-tariff measures in the agreement, such as. B speeding up the examination of applications for the marketing of genetically modified plants and animals. (Inside U.S Trade, March 24, 2020. Subscription required.) U.S. farmers who rely on USDA Market Facilitation Program (MFP) payments are particularly vulnerable to retaliation. This program compensates in part for estimated revenue declines due to the effect of Chinese retaliatory duties on U.S.
agricultural exports. No agreement has yet been signed and some of them remain uns written. Trump said Friday that the deal “depends on whether everything will be on paper,” but added that he does not foresee any problems with that process. It will be difficult to assess the deal and the Trump administration`s claims about it, as details specific to the deal`s product will not be released “to prevent market manipulation,” according to Politico. This statement roughly acknowledges that the agreement distorts trade in the products it covers. Nevertheless, the absence of an agreement convinces: allowing a set volume of duty-free exports (tariff rate quotas or TRQ) for soybeans (Chapter 3, Annex 14, paragraph 1), the most valuable of US exports to China, as well as China`s insistence that all WTO members be able to export on these conditions, the IATP will not compensate US farmers for revenues lost as a result of the trade war. China imposed a tariff exemption that allowed for an increase in U.S. soybean exports at the end of 2019, but not at the 2017 starting level as China diversified its sources of soybean imports from South American countries. In broad daylight, how could China no longer agree on the agreement? In fact, the agreement contains a force majeure clause that was inserted when Chinese authorities, but not Americans, knew there was a deadly pandemic. How did the clause allowing non-compliance in the event of unforeseen circumstances manage to enter into the agreement? The following report, taken from citizens power initiatives for China`s comprehensive research report “China and the Pandemic,” tells the story: “This is not a trade deal.